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Trumpism without Trump

In an interview a few days ago, New Democracy MP and former Migration minister Dimitris Kairidis said that he disagreed with “domestic Trumpists,” because, he said, they are serving “their own agenda.” He even said that their number is dropping. He was right on both points, but ignored a third parameter: not the US president’s popularity or that of his local defenders, but the resonance of Trumpist ideas. Greece has very little of the first, a bit of the second and quite a lot of the third.

Let’s look at the numbers, for starters. In its latest survey, YouGov found that 88% of Germans, 87% of Italians, 86% of Spaniards and 95% of Danes have an unfavorable view of Trump. Pew paints a similar picture: In Greece, confidence in Trump fell from 37% in 2025 to 22% this year, the steepest decline in Europe alongside Italy.

The drop is even reflected in the relationship with the United States itself. Asked whether America is a reliable ally, the yes plummeted from 83% in 2022 to 31% today in Sweden; in the Netherlands from 88% to 41%; and in Germany from 83% to 39%. Within just a few years, one man managed to shift perceptions of a relationship between nations that we once considered remarkably resilient to changes in government. Greece is an exception here. For historical reasons, Greek public opinion had never embraced the image of America as a long-standing ally to the same extent. As a result, the decline was much smaller, from 52% to 48%. We did not shift closer to our European partners; they moved closer to us.

Let’s now take a look at the political “family” that aligned itself with Trump more than any other: the far right. Here lies one of its paradoxes: It is at once fiercely nationalist and highly internationalized. Morten Messerschmidt, leader of the Danish People’s Party, had traveled to Mar-a-Lago in search of political kinship with the MAGA movement. After the clash over Greenland, he found himself insisting that he served “no cause other than Denmark.” The internationalism of nationalism reaches its limits when an ideological ally poses a threat to your own country.

Ideas, however, travel much more easily than faces. In Greece, only 22% trust Donald Trump, but 33% approve of his migration policy – coming third in Europe after Hungary and Poland. Support for a “strong leader” who does not let himself be tied down by parliament or elections comes to 17.7%, up 8.7 percentage points from 2017. What’s more, 30.9% of Greeks believe votes are rarely or never counted fairly, with nearly one in three believing the official result may be different from the actual one.

The French have a term for when ideas are more popular than the political figure who embodies them: “lepenisation des esprits.” It has become easy to use Trump himself as an alibi – to profess opposition to him as a way of overcompensating for embracing views that he has made his rallying cry. And these views are not expressed only by the self-appointed representatives of Trumpism in Greece, but also by government officials, precisely because they have seeped into the political mainstream and their acceptance is no longer associated with attitudes toward Trump himself.

And this, perhaps, is where Greek Trumpism’s structural weakness lies. Just as Ralf Dahrendorf argued that social democracy became a victim of its own success – losing its appeal because it had already established the status quo – Trumpism here appears to suffer from much the same problem: Many things that remain taboo elsewhere simply are not taboo here. We moved almost directly from a pre-woke to a post-woke period without ever experiencing genuine woke hegemony. With no countervailing force pulling the status quo in the opposite direction, the balance is already where a successful Trumpism would have shifted it. There are no swing voters left to win over.

Kairidis, therefore, is right: The number of Trumpists is dropping. Not because they have been defeated, but because no one needs them anymore.

Elias Dinas is a professor in comparative politics and holds the Swiss Chair in Federalism, Democracy and International Governance at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Read the original article →